Contents Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations xiii Introduction: Use and Waste in the Global Nuclear Order 1 1. Intentions and Effects: The Proliferation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 27 2. Whose Nuclear Order? A Postcolonial Critique of an Enlightenment Project 75 3. Unusable, Dangerous, and Desirable: Nuclear Weapons as Fetish Commodities 109 4. Costly Weapons: The Political Economy of Nuclear Power 135 Conclusion. Decolonizing the Nuclear World: Can the Subaltern Speak? 171 Appendix. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 201 Notes 209 Bibliography 241 Index 267.
Acknowledgments I am pleased to have this opportunity to express my grati- tude to some of the mentors, friends, and comrades who have shaped my intellectual formation and helped sustain my intellectual pursuits. Conditions of work are integral to all our labors. This is even more true for women and minority scholars in an increasingly neoliberal academy. In that context, the Department of Politics at Whitman College is a remarkable place to live and work. But one of the joys of working in this liberal arts college has been the vast network of colleagues from a variety of differ- ent disciplines who have enhanced my intellectual life in so many ways. I owe a special thanks to Tim Kaufman- Osborn for his generous mentor- ship over the years. Phil Brick, Paul Apostolidis, Susanne Beechey, Aaron Bobrow- Strain, Melisa Casumbal- Salazar, Kristy King, Leena Knight, Tom Knight, Gaurav Majumdar, Dalia Rokhsana, Nicole Simek, and Zahi Zalloua have enriched my professional and personal lives in so many ways. Elyse Semerdjian and Jon Walters have been wonderfully enlivening intellectual allies. Jeanne Morefield inspired and guided me in more ways than I can enumerate. Finally, the friendship, intellectual camaraderie, and support of Bruce Magnusson have been vital to my work. I have also had the good fortune of working with some of the brightest and edgiest students who sharpened my thinking and clarified my political commitments in ways that I could not have anticipated. There are too many of them to list here, but so many have gone on to make all manners of change in the world. Here I must thank Mitch Dunn, Marten King, and Sara Rasmussen for all their help with research and writing, and I must especially thank Thomas Friedenbach, without whose early help with research I could not have con- ceived or executed this project. Outside Whitman, I have been sustained by a wide circle of friends and colleagues who have both carved out a space for the kind of work I am inspired to do and engaged with my work in many different ways. Bud Duvall and Naeem Inayatullah first taught me to trust my intellectual · xi ·.
Abbreviations ABM Anti- Ballistic Missile (Treaty) ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ACDIS Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security AEC Atomic Energy Commission ANA Alliance for Nuclear Accountability BAS Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists BESA Begin– Sadat Center for Strategic Studies CACNP Center for Arms Control and Non- Proliferation CDI Center for Defense Information CEA Commissarait a L’Energie Atomique CISAC Center for International Security and Cooperation CITS Center for International Trade and Security CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies CRDF (U.S.) Civilian and Research Development Foundation CRS Congressional Research Service CSI Container Security Initiative CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies CSP Center for Security Policy CTBT Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization CTR (Nunn– Lugar) Cooperative Threat Reduction DAE Department of Atomic Energy DPG Delhi Policy Group DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency ENDC Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community FAS Federation of American Scientists FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty G8 Group of Eight GDP gross domestic product GICNT Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism GNEP Global Nuclear Energy Partnership · xiii ·.
· INTRODUCTION · Use and Waste in the Global Nuclear Order Three Nuclear Events: Tales of Order and Disorder “Order” and “disorder” have shaped the nuclear world. Nuclear fission is the process of splitting the center of an atom to set in motion a process of radioactive decay. The remarkable scientific discovery of how to make and sustain such a chain reaction to generate incredible amounts of energy pro- duced some of humankind’s loftiest aspirations as well as its most apoca- lyptic nightmares. In its utopian incarnation of nuclear energy, nuclear fis- sion can solve our most pressing energy needs—i t can deliver us from the environmental limits of relentless capital accumulation and consumerism and, indeed, reign us back from the portending dystopia of global climate change. But in its dystopian incarnation, nuclear fission— now not so well contained within an exploding concrete structure (Fukushima Daiichi), now in the form of uncontrolled destruction inflicted on hapless inno- cents (Hiroshima and Nagasaki)— becomes a nuclear nightmare. An ap- preciation for this enormous potential of nuclear decentering and the de- sire to harness its possibilities and control its dangers generated a “global nuclear order,” centered on a much- celebrated and extremely important treaty— the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was one among many efforts to craft a global nuclear order to restrain the dangers of nuclear power, while liberating its “peaceful” possibilities for the larger collective good.
· CHAPTER 1 · Intentions and Effects The Proliferation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation regime The Case for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament An odd constellation of forces arguing for nuclear disarmament suddenly appears to have emerged on the global scene. Even though the lively an- tinuclear movement of the Cold War era dissipated in anticipation of the “peace dividend” that was to follow the end of U.S.– Soviet nuclear an- tagonism, many cautious voices on the left continued to urge restraint and advocate disarmament by the infamous club of the “nuclear five.”1 What is interesting, however, is to see this chorus expand to include voices that, though always nervous about the perils of proliferation outside the club, were at one time fierce defenders of nuclear weapons for the club, many of them architects of nuclear deterrence doctrines that justified the possession of those weapons. So, for instance, two former secretaries of state (George Shultz and Henry Kissinger), one former secretary of de- fense (William J. Perry), and one former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sam Nunn)— all well- known cold warriors in the United States—h ave together mounted a fairly visible public relations cam- paign to persuade current leaders and policy makers of the wisdom of mov- ing to global nuclear zero.2 Many strategic thinkers and scholars continue to argue that nuclear deterrence— long heralded for its contributions to keeping the peace between two hostile armed-t o-t he-t eeth superpowers— still works quite effectively in relations between states, including the new nuclear states outside of the original club.3 But the fears that drive the cur- rent calls for disarmament are not just from the slow horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to states outside the nuclear club but also from its diago- nal spread to actors who can no longer be counted on to behave with the requisite rationality necessary for deterrence to function.4 Although some of this concern is directed toward “rogue states,”5 the rise of transnational · 27 ·.
· CHAPTER 2 · Whose Nuclear Order? a Postcolonial critique of an enlightenment Project Whither the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? In the massive regime erected to stall and eliminate nuclear weapons pos- session that the previous chapter discussed, the NPT has had a certain pride of place. Signed in 1968 and going into effect in 1970, with all but four countries in the world as party to the treaty, the NPT has long been considered quite effective in preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Among some of its strongest supporters on the left, it has also been celebrated for enshrining the principle of disarmament. However, there appears to be a fair bit of recent anxiety that the NPT may be in crisis. A series of events in the last decade—t he nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998; the withdrawal of North Korea from the treaty in 2003, followed by its nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009; concerns about a nuclear weapons program under way in Iran (which remains a signatory of the treaty);1 the discovery in 2003 of the vast reach of the nuclear smug- gling network run by former Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan; fears of nuclear proliferation to terrorist actors; and the negotiation of the 2003 Indian– U.S. nuclear treaty that effectively, even if not formally, recognizes India’s nuclear status (something prohibited by the terms of the NPT)— have raised serious questions about the future viability of the NPT. In short, the NPT, once considered a stalwart treaty in its ability to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and perhaps provide a mechanism to move to- ward global disarmament sometime in the future, appears to be fraying from numerous loose strands. The unraveling of the 2005 NPT review conference only fortified this general feeling, exacerbated by the unilateralist thrust of the previous U.S. administration’s interests in counterproliferation, mis- sile defense, and even nuclear testing and the development of “useable” nuclear weapons. Some have hailed the recently signed and ratified New · 75 ·.
· CHAPTER 3 · Unusable, Dangerous, and Desirable Nuclear Weapons as fetish commodities From Energy to Weapons: The Ontology of Danger The previous chapter discussed what is considered one of the two grand bar- gains in the negotiation of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT)— the permission that existing nuclear weapons states (NWS) had to re- tain their possession of their nuclear stockpiles in return for a (weakly worded) commitment to nuclear disarmament sometime in the indeter- minate future. Much has also been made of the second of those bargains, considered to be a serious loophole in a treaty that aims to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons—p ermitting states to house the en- tire nuclear fuel cycle within their countries for the purposes of civilian uses of nuclear energy, even though the enriched uranium or plutonium produced through that process may eventually, with some extra effort, be turned toward nuclear weapons production. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in North Korea, which continued its clandestine weap- ons program while a signatory to the NPT, before withdrawing from it to test its own nuclear device, and is the current concern about the Iranian nuclear program that Iran claims is for civilian purposes, while others re- main suspicious that the enriched uranium produced by Iran will soon be turned toward weapons use. Implicit in the treaty, then, is the assumption that there is a clear ontological distinction between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy and that it is the former that is far more dangerous and worthy of extensive preventive efforts, while the latter is benign or even vital to economic development. It bears reminding here that much of the current controversy regarding Iran has to do with uncertainty about how one tells, short of a declared state intention to weaponize (as with India, Pakistan, and North Korea), when and how the break from nuclear energy to nuclear weapons occurs.1 · 109 ·.
· CHAPTER 4 · Costly Weapons The Political economy of Nuclear Power From Accidents to Costs I have already referred to the provocative “more may be better” argument made by well- known neorealist international relations scholar Kenneth Waltz (1981)—t hat the proliferation of nuclear weapons induces cautious deterrent practices among rational states, thus enhancing global security and stability. In his also well-k nown rebuttal of what is called the “nuclear optimism” argument, Scott Sagan (1994) paints a rather bleak image of alleged state rationality, pointing to the myriad instances of near- misses and close mishaps induced by the less than fully rational dynamics of the organizational systems and cultures responsible for administering nuclear weapons. The category of “accident” or “mistakes” is central to Sagan’s quite compelling critique, as well as to “nuclear pessimism” accounts more generally, and indeed, it carries quite a heavy weight in antinuclear activ- ism. This is true both for nuclear weapons abolitionists, such as Jonathan Schell (2000), and in the characterization of nuclear energy disasters of the sort that occurred at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi.1 Suggestive of a lack of malignant cause or responsibility in nuclear politics, the reified status of “accidents” in a sense partakes in the fetishiza- tion of nuclear weapons, suggesting the possibility of managerial control exercised through the rationalist strategizing of deterrence (Chaloupka 1992, 12– 16). Furthermore, this sort of characterization presumes the im- possibility of foreseeing the consequences of investment in nuclear re- sources and in a sense evacuates any institutional or structural responsi- bility from the disasters that may follow such investment, although much public effort will be expended after any such “accident” in deciphering its cause or apportioning appropriate blame on particular actors (Thompson 1982, 20).2 In addition, “accidents” focus one’s attention on the dangers of · 135 ·.
· CONCLUSION · Decolonizing the Nuclear World can the subaltern speak? M ainstream international relations (IR) theory— particularly in its neorealist and neoliberal incarnations— cannot capture the “third world security predicament,” argues Mohammed Ayoob. This is what motivates Ayoob to create a version of realism that he calls “subaltern realism,” to capture the different dynamics of domestic vari- ables and external pressures through which third world states express their foreign policy behaviors. Ayoob is not interested in troubling the notion of security or rejecting the state- centricity of traditional realism, but he lambasts IR scholars for their ethnocentric generalizations from the expe- rience of richer and more secure first world states, a neocolonial vantage position from which they cannot hear how the subaltern speak their very historically and geographically specific insecurities (Ayoob 1983–8 4; 1989; 1991; 1995; 1997; 1998; 2002). I find it hard not to be at least somewhat sympathetic to Ayoob’s attempts, against many criticisms over the course of a long and distinguished career, to mark out a space of third world voice within an overwhelmingly Eurocentric discipline. But can the third world as subaltern really speak from this space? In her widely influential piece titled “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” post- colonial feminist theorist Gayatri Spivak raises this very question of the “subaltern”—t hat most oppressed of figures, subordinated through struc- tures of both imperialism and nationalism, and for whom many opposi- tional movements claim to speak (Spivak 2010a). Exemplified in some of her other work by the severely exploited “tribal” Indian woman— made abject through the multiple axes of gender, class, caste, and nation— Spivak asks if and how the subaltern can speak in and through the existing discur- sive structures available to her (Spivak 1995; 2010a; 2010b). In the end, sug- gests Spivak, the subaltern cannot speak because her speech is inaudible or unintelligible to those in power.