* J * INTRODUCTION Karl Marx's proposition, "the country that is more developed industrially only shows . . . the less developed [country] the image of its own future," was a commonplace at the time it was written and has remained so to the present day. The majority of its proponents have also agreed that economic development numbers "political modernization" among its natural concom- itants. Within these boundaries, however, there has been per- sistent disagreement about the meaning of political modernity and its implications for civil liberty and human freedom. In particular, there has been an on-going debate between two distinct schools, which can be called the liberal-democratic and the administrative-technocratic. These designations, it should be stressed, do not necessarily refer to the value preferences of particular theorists, but rather to the principles of authority that the latter associate with political modernity. According to the adherents of the liberal-democratic school, the extension of individual liberty and popular self-government is an almost inevitable concomitant of economic development. To be sure, many contemporary political sociologists qualify their confidence in the democratizing "logic" of economic development by recognizing that rapid industrialization in an economically backward society is likely to entail a sharp curtailment of indi- vidual liberty and popular self-government. However, they re- main convinced that the ultimate outcome of economic devel- opment is certain to be democracy. This is true, for example, of Gabriel Almond, who uses the "Anglo-American" political system 1 .
* 2 * BOLSHEVIK MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION Socialism has no . . . need to concern it- self with the organization of industry, since capitalism does that. Georges Sorel Anyone who approaches prerevolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory in search of a comprehensive and systematic doctrine of industrial organization and management is foredoomed to dis- appointment. The patristic writings provide no warrant for present-day Soviet claims to the effect that "Marx, Engels, and Lenin left quite unambiguous and quite precise instructions regarding the chief principles of socialist economic manage- ment." 1 Indeed, such claims run directly counter to the tes- timony of the founders of the Bolshevik regime. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, Lenin himself acknowl- edged that there was no "concrete plan for the organization of economic life," while Trotsky frankly conceded that, in the sphere of the organization of labor, the victorious Bolsheviks confronted "new questions and new difficulties . . . [for which] socialist theory had no answers."2 This point once established, however, it must not be pressed too far. If the classical theorists' concern with such problems was sporadic and discursive, it was nonetheless real and it would be wrong to underestimate either its scope or its intensity. In fact, Marx, Engels, and Lenin did address themselves to "the chief principles of socialist economic management." And, when the 12 .
* 3 * THE BOURGEOIS SPECIALISTS Engineer Zabelin: I don't know if there's much I can do. Stalin: That, of course, we don't know. Zabelin: IH never make a Bolshevik. Stalin: That's possible. Zabelin: You're planning to build socialism in Russia and I don't believe in socialism. Lenin (with a sudden flash, cheerfully): But I do. Who's right? Zabelin: I realize what I say is like child's prattle to you. Stalin: But you're not an expert on social- ism. Zabelin: No, of course not. I can't say I know much about it. Stalin: Then why pass judgment on some- thing that's not in your field? Nikolai Pogodin, The Chimes of the Kremlin The revolution quickly dispelled whatever illusions might have existed regarding the technical intelligentsia's pro-Bolshevik sympathies. Far from supporting the Bolsheviks, the vast major- ity of engineers and industrial specialists was squarely behind the Provisional Government and strongly opposed to the October coup. While only a small percentage of the technical intel- ligentsia appears to have gone so far as to enlist in the White camp or to join the emigration, a large percentage appears to have participated in an organized campaign of boycotting Bol- shevik-controlled offices and refusing to comply with Bolshevik- 28 .
• 4 * THE RED DIRECTORS The party as it existed earlier, in the period of its illegality, when there was a single psychology and a single ideology, has split into a variety of separate columns . . . Military workers, soviet workers, trade union workers, and party workers proper have organized together among themselves . . . The task at present is anew to collect the party, to eliminate all deviations, to unite the party ideologically. Nikolai Bukharin (1921) The higher organs of our party are consti- tuted almost exactly as they were two de- cades ago, but the tasks of the party have changed quantitatively and qualitatively. I tell you, you are no longer an underground party; you are the government of a huge country. Leonid Krasin (1923) Although their services were indispensable, the bourgeois spe- cialists do not deserve exclusive credit for the rapid industrial recovery and growth that characterized the first two decades of Bolshevik rule. Above all, they must share pride of place with the so-called red directors, the Communists whom the party assigned to managerial posts in the first years after the revolu- tion.1 It was this group of perhaps five thousand men which occupied the "commanding heights" and strategic bluffs of the industrial establishment during the heyday of the specialist- regime alliance and which supplied the cadres that were in 65 .
• 5 * THE MANAGERIAL ELITE AFTER THE PURGE After the purge colorless people replaced the old directors. They were made by the party. The old ones were creating the party and the Soviet system. The new ones: one even talked differently to them. It was stressed that they depended on the party. True, the possibility to exercise power still exists for them. But they lack the willpower to do so. A Soviet refugee One man is prince and all others are slaves who act as ministers and aid in governing the country through his grace and permis- sion. Machiavelli Given the circumstances of their rise to elite status, the men who succeeded the red directors, the "red specialists," could not have doubted that Stalin was engaged in a ritual propitiation of the ideological gods when he used the forum of the Eight- eenth Party Congress to invite them to become "active par- ticipant [s] in the political leadership of the country."1 They were well aware that the political system which Stalin had so diligently established over the course of the past decade and so ruthlessly consolidated by means of the just completed Great Purge demanded a sharp restriction of the number of active par- ticipants in political leadership. They did not have to be told that they had been catapulted into the ranks of the managerial elite only because Stalin was confident that he could confine 103 .
* 6 * THE EMERGING MANAGERIAL ELITE After the death of Stalin we entered upon a period of destruction and re-evalua- tion. It is a slow and inconsistent process, it lacks perspective, and the inertia of both past and future lie heavy on it. Today's children will scarcely be able to produce a new God, capable of inspiring humanity into the next historical cycle. Maybe He will have to be supplemented by other stakes of the Inquisition, by further "per- sonality cults," and by new terrestial labors, so that after many centuries a new Purpose will rise above the world. But today no one yet knows its name. Abram Tertz, On Socialist Realism (trans. Dennis) I really think that what we are discussing boils down to the Party's future recruiting program; if the Party can enlist enough people whose ideas and opinions coincide with its own, then perhaps it can last for a very long time. But is this actually possible? George Kennan (in Aron, ed., World Technology, p. 86) In 1964 Izvestia published a profile of L. M. Filyukov, the newly appointed director of the Bryansk machinebuilding plant, thereby introducing its readers to a more or less typical repre- sentative of the cadres that will soon displace the red specialists as the dominant group within the Soviet industrial establishment.1 Like Filyukov, most of the members of the emerging managerial 152 .
• 7 * CONCLUSION By settled habit the technicians, engineers, and industrial experts are a harmless and docile sort, well fed on the whole and some- what placidly content with the "full dinner pail" which the . . . Vested Interests ha- bitually allow them. Thorstein Veblen, The Engineers and the Price System The fact that the renowned aeronautical engineer A. N. Tupolyov designed one of his best planes while confined in a Stalinist prison may or may not symbolize the irrepressible creativity inherent in the Soviet system.1 It certainly symbolizes the docility and political impotence that have characterized the role of the technical intelligentsia and managerial elite in the development of that system. Although theories of political de- velopment which cast the engineers and managers in the role of foreordained "gravediggers of Communism" have been common for over fifty years, they have found little confirmation in events. At almost every step, the technicians have bowed to the dictates of the ruling elite, and, in those cases where they have proved somewhat recalcitrant, their resistance has ultimately been futile. What political influence they have had has been primarily a function of their unquestioning acceptance of an instrumental and dependent role, and the only periods during which they have acquired a certain independence have been those in which the central leadership has been internally split. Far from grow- ing at a progressive and ever-accelerating rate, in other words, 173 .
WORKS CITED Abramovitch, Raphael R. The Soviet Revolution, 1917-1939. New York: International Universities Press, 1962. Achminow, German F. La Puissance dans l'ombre: ou, le fossoyeur du Communisme. Paris: Les lies d'Or, 1952. Alexandrov (Michaelson), Alexander S. Kto upravlyaet Rossiei? (Who Rules Russia?). Berlin: Parabola, 1933. Almond, Gabriel A., and James S. Coleman, eds. The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. The Anatomy of Terror: Khrushchev's Revelations about Stalin's Regime. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Andronnikov, S. Rost i vospitanie bolshevistskikh kadrov (The Growth and Education of the Bolshevik Cadres). Leningrad: Gazetno- Zhurnalnoe i Knizhnoe Izdatelstvo Leningradskovo Soveta, RK i KD, 1939. Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center, Report of Court Proceedings. Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice of the USSR, 1937. Arakelian, A. Industrial Management in the USSR. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950. Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Viking Press, 1963. The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951. Armstrong, John A. The Politics of Totalitarianism: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1934 to the Present. New York: Random House, 1961. The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. Aron, Raymond. "Soviet Society in Transition," Problems of Com- munism, VI (November-December 1957). ed. World Technology and Human Destiny. Ann Arbor: Uni- versity of Michigan Press, 1963. Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. "Possible Effects of Khrushchev's Over- throw," Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union, no. 10. Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1964-1965. "Soviet Decentralization," Bulletin, IV, no. 3. Munich: Insti- tute for the Study of the USSR, 1957. Azhaev, Vasily Nikolaevich. Daleko ot Moskvy (Far from Moscow). Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Khudozhestvennoi Litera- tury, 1952. Azrael, Jeremy R. "The Educational System as an Agency of Political 183 .
NOTES All of the book and article titles cited below are given in con- densed form; for full data see Works Cited. A few frequently cited and widely known sources and journals are given in abbreviation throughout: CSP Current Soviet Policies (Gruliow, ed.) CW Lenin, Complete Works (Polnoe sobranie sochineny) Komm. Kommunist KPSS v Rez. Kommunisticheskaya partia sovetskovo soyuza v rezol- yutsiakh i resheniakh syezdov, konferentsy, i plenumov TsK PS Partiinoe stroitelstvo PZ Partiinaya zhizn Full listing for records of party conferences and congresses are in- cluded in Works Cited under Communist Party. Citations are ab- breviated in notes as: I Konferentsia I Syezd 1. INTRODUCTION 1. Almond and Coleman, eds., Politics of Developing Areas, intro- duction, esp. pp. 17-26. 2. Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, chaps. 2 and 3, esp. pp. 51, 56-57, 60, 64, 67-68, 71, 85, 97; MIT Study Group, "The Transitional Process," pp. 618-641. 3. See Hayek, The Counter-Revolution, esp. pp. 121, 137; Mark- ham, ed., Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, pp. 2-11, 70—71, 76-80. 4. See Weber, The Theory, pp. 337-339, 403; Gerth and Mills, eds., From Max Weber, pp. 49-50, 70-72, 82, 91, 231-233; Michels, Political Parties, esp. p. 383. 5. Haas, "Technocracy," p. 70. 6. See Croan, "The Politics of Marxist Sovietology"; Deutscher, Russia in Transition; Marcuse, Soviet Marxism; Rostow, "Rostow on Growth," esp. p. 414; Brzezinski, "Communist Disunity"; Ulam, "The New Face." 7. Brzezinski, "Communist Disunity," p. 17; Ulam, "The New Face," p. 407. 8. Achminow, La Puissance dans Vombre. 203 .
INDEX Accounting and assignment depart- Beria, L. P., 108 ment, 72, 74, 82, 221n28, 221n36. Berliner, Joseph, 4 See also Cadres department Beshchev, B. P., 134 Adzhubei, Alexei, 147 Birman, S. P., 91-92 All-Russian Association of Engineers, Bogdanov, P. A., 75, 167, 221n28, 55 221n29 Almond, Gabriel, 1 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 3 Alsky, A. O., 80 Bukharin, N„ 31, 45, 54, 65 "Americanism," 79, 90, 94 Bulganin, N. A., 132, 136 Anarcho-syndicalism, 34; in patristic management doctrine, 18-20; in Cadres department, 124. See also Ac- party, 41-46, 47, 223n43. See also counting and assignment depart- Workers' management; Opposition ment groups Central Asian sovnarkhoz, 145 Apparat (party): role in industrial Central Committee (party), 70-86, management, 51-52, 71-75, 78-79, 93, 96, 97, 134, 138, 145-146; 83-85, 92-93, 104, 117-118, 125, managerial representation on, 80, 133, 134-135, 144-146, 165, 167- 84, 95 169; as political power base, 78, Plenums: September 1925, 47; 88, 102, 106, 131-132, 142, 144- July 1928, 239n54; November 146, 148; managerial assignments 1929, 239n54; January 1933, 90- in, 80, 84, 95, 118-119, 127-128, 91; February-March 1937, 129; 166. See also Accounting and July 1955, 134, 242n68, 246n83; assignment department; Cadres December 1956, 136, 137, 245- department; Central Committee 246n83; February 1957, 244-245n- (party); Communist Party; Secre- 78; June 1957, 136, 137, 138, 143; tariat of the Central Committee November 1962, 138, 145, 248n- (party) 111; October 1964, 147; Septem- Arendt, Hannah, 64 ber 1965, 249nl22. See also Ac- Aron, Raymond, 4 counting and assignment depart- ment; Apparat (party); Cadres de- Badaev, A. Ye., 227n75 partment; Communist Party; Eco- Bakunin, M., 16, 17 nomic Bureau (party); Orgburo; Bardin, I. P., 37 Politburo; Presidium (party); Sec- Bauer, Otto, 3 retariat of the Central Committee Bauer, Raymond A., 50, 130 (party) Bauman Technical Institute, 124 Central Control Commission, 42, 72, Bazarov, V. A., 54, 61 74, 82, 221-222n36 Bebel, August, 25 Central Executive Committee, 99 253 .